SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
DEPARTMENT R-5 HON. CARA D. HUTSON, JUDGE
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
Plaintiff,)
vs.) Case No. FWV21002096
WILLIAM SHAE MCKAY,
Defendant.)
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL PROCEEDINGS
NOVEMBER 8, 2021
APPEARANCES:
For the People: JASON ANDERSON
District Attorney BY: TESS PONCE
Deputy District Attorney
For the Defendant: WILLIAM SHAE MCKAY
IN PRO PER BY: WILLIAM SHAE MCKAY
REPORTED BY: Julie Quintanilla Official Reporter
CSR No. 11309

RANCHO CUCAMONGA, CALIFORNIA; MONDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2021 1 MORNING SESSION 2 DEPARTMENT NO. R-5 HON. CARA D. HUTSON, JUDGE 3 **APPEARANCES:** 4 5 (The Defendant WILLIAM SHAE MCKAY, is present in pro per; TESS PONCE, Deputy 6 District Attorney of San Bernardino 7 8 County, representing the People of the 9 State of California.) (Julie Quintanilla, Official Reporter, 10 C.S.R. No. 11309.) 11 12 THE COURT: Back on the record in Mr. McKay's matter. 13 Ms. Ponce is present. Mr. McKay is present. The Court got 14 notified Friday by my clerk that Ms. Ponce has something to put 15 on the record for the Court. The Court has no idea because that 16 would be ex parting Mr. McKay so she couldn't give me heads up. 17 So Ms. Ponce, the floor is yours. 18 MS. PONCE: Thank you, your Honor. I have something for 19 20 Mr. McKay, maybe Deputy Carbo can give that to Mr. McKay. this is the Court's copy. 21 It came to light on Friday, came to my attention that 22 there was a federal indictment for the alleged victim in this 23 24 case. THE COURT: Wow. 25 MR. MCKAY: There's what? 26 MS. PONCE: And the incident pre-dates the incident in 27 this case by, I think, about eight months, something like that. 28

But I was not aware of it previously. I had run the rap sheet prior to the preliminary hearing in July, nothing stood out, as far as things that needed to be exposed. Nothing showed up on her rap sheet. And just to confirm that, I ran it again on Friday --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MS. PONCE: -- and nothing popped up. It wouldn't indicate warrants that we could see or any kind of flags based on that. And I just thought it would be best to disclose that as soon as I knew.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MCKAY: Your Honor, I think that's a big -- I've been saying the whole time that Ms. Little she was a very -- I'm at a loss for words right now. And then twice we get served an immunity packet. It's like very coincidental, and I'm not accusing Ms. Ponce of anything, obviously, because you don't know federal things, right? I was told by the bail bondsman that Ms. Lisa had charges. And I specifically told Ms. Ponce look into her, you got the wrong person here. Look into the person who says they're the victim, please. And this whole time I sat My dog is still missing. My other one is at the pound. I had to bury the other one. There's people at my house still. The cops raided my house, like, three weeks ago, for these people that were at my house and took over all of my stuff. asked -- I told Ms. Ponce when I went September 23rd, you have the time right now to get on the side of right. Right now you can look into this, now that I'm telling you, maybe Gary didn't tell her these things.

I said you have time right now to get on the side of right. Look into this. Here is my reservation number. Here is this, look she had this. I know the lady was foul. And I didn't know that when we became friends. She was a friend of mine. She was there for me at a time when I had nobody, like Ms. Ponce said. And I still appreciate the words that Ms. Ponce said last Thursday, because it shows me I'm not just an animal to her anymore, maybe you guys look at me a little bit different, just a little bit. I might be an animal in my own cage but I stay in my cage.

THE COURT: Okay. So for the record, what the Court received was a federal, it looked like our equivalent to an Information showing charges which included importation of the drug known as Fentanyl.

And Mr. McKay, the only relevance the Court sees in that, is it would be impeachable evidence and I still have it. So it works as impeachable evidence. I know that this lady has been charged, though not convicted, I don't think. There might be a warrant out for her. I'm not certain, because I just made a cursory glance. But, yes, I want Mr. McKay and Ms. Ponce to know before I give my ruling, which I'm going to give in a moment, that the Court knows that Ms. Little's hands are not clean. I'll just leave it that way. So she's not an angel to this Court. And that is considering — that is going to be considered within the ruling and verdicts that I am going to give in this matter. So without further ado, I'm going to give my court reporter this in case I talk too fast.

Before I give my decision, I would like to say that this

case is extremely unfortunate. I do believe that Mr. McKay was a victim of burglary to his home, and that because Ms. Little had his property in her possession, she probably knew who took the rest of it. The record will reflect that Ms. Little's attorney Mr. James Brown was present for the majority of her testimony.

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But here's the problem which Mr. McKay has reiterated to the Court on more than one occasion. The way he lives his life is not necessarily the way of the legal system. In this instance, the Court knows beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. McKay decided to take matters into his own hands and dispense his brand of street justice in this matter. His way is not to involve law enforcement. But unfortunately, Ms. Little did involve law enforcement which triggers the obligation of this Court to sort through what has and has not been proven throughout the trial. The Court bases its rulings on the facts elicited in this trial. And now I'm also considering the new evidence that Ms. Ponce has provided to the Court. I'm ordering that that be filed and placed as part of the record since the Court just received it today. The preliminary hearing transcript of the victim's statements only, as well as the statements made by the defendant throughout the course of this trial acting as his own counsel.

I will start in the order of the counts presented in the Information.

Count 1, Penal Code Section 209(b)(1), kidnapping for the purpose of committing robbery. In order to find whether this charge is sustainable, I must first determine whether or not a kidnapping occurred. One of the elements concerns whether or not

the defendant moved Ms. Little a, quote, "substantial distance," end quote. The law defines substantial distance as follows:

More than a slight or trivial distance. I must consider all the circumstances relating to the movement, i.e., whether that movement was incidental to another crime, whether there was an increase of physical or psychological harm, whether the movement increased the danger of a foreseeable escape attempt, or gave the attacker a greater opportunity to commit additional crimes. All of these criteria relate uniquely to an analysis Penal Code Section 209(b)(1).

I looked at CALCRIM and the leading case on this is People versus Martinez, which is a 1999 case. Cited at 20
Cal.4th, 225, which was overruled on other grounds, which defines the requirement of asportation. Summarizing, the court held that a movement of the victim must be substantial in character to meet the asportation requirement, but there are other factors which may be considered. It must be more than incidental to the commission of any underlying crime, and that increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the underlying crime itself.

There is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the statute. The key is, is the victim subjected to a greater risk of harm. The Martinez court urges this Court to look at the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the distance moved is only a very short distance. The trier of fact must determine the scope and nature of the movement.

This case specifically mentions Penal Code

Section 209(b)(1) and says, "In a kidnapping case involving an associated crime, the trier of fact should consider whether the distance a victim was moved was incidental to the commission of that crime in determining the substantiality of the movement. Such consideration is relevant to determining whether more than one crime was committed applying the facts to the case at bar.

According to her testimony, which the Court finds was inconsistent at times regarding the order of events, as well as their duration, Ms. Little was moved from the garage, which was closed, to the living room, which was blocked, to a bedroom closet with shielded windows and back throughout her ordeal. The distance between these places appears slight as evidenced in the exhibits, specifically Exhibit 28, the entrance to the kitchen, Exhibit 29, the living room to the hallway, and Exhibit 47, the defendant's home.

There did not appear to be added danger to the victim between locations. Additionally, the movement of the victim did not assist in the alleged robbery because the movement of the victim did not contribute in any way to the carrying out of the robbery as is required in *Martinez*. The movement was merely incidental.

Because the People have not proven that a kidnapping took place under the applicable case law, the Court finds the defendant not guilty of Count 1.

Count 2 Penal Code Section 207(a) kidnapping, per the analysis already articulated in Count 1, the Court finds the defendant not guilty of Count 2.

Count 3, Penal Code Section 236 false imprisonment by

violence. The Court finds that Mr. McKay did restrain Ms. Little by violence. The Court knows from statements made by Mr. McKay and Ms. Little that he was very angry at what he perceived to be a betrayal and collusion with thieves in regard to his home.

Ms. Little did give inconsistent statements, but what is sure is that at some point Mr. McKay demanded to know who had his property, that Ms. Little knew those people, and that Mr. McKay was so angry that he struck her in the face and stranded her at his home by taking her car, and various credit cards, social security cards, and other things necessary for her to leave.

Additionally, Ms. Little was left with Josh, who was there to keep her there per instruction. What was also obvious to the Court was that this was all done against Ms. Little's will. Ms. Little did go to the house voluntarily in some attempt to curry favor with Mr. McKay by bailing him out of jail and cooking him food. But once she got there the second time around, she was not free to leave until Mr. McKay said so. The Court finds the defendant guilty of Count 3 beyond a reasonable doubt.

Count 4, Penal Code Section 69, resisting an executive officer. Deputy Cole testified as to Mr. McKay running from the car once it became disabled. Although there was a knife in his hand, the Court heard no evidence of Mr. McKay brandishing it at any law enforcement or striking the officer in any way or making the threat thereof. Therefore, as one of the elements to prove this charge is that the defendant used violence or a threat of violence against law enforcement, the Court finds him not guilty of Penal Code Section 69. However, as he did ignore several commands to stop, as Deputy Cole testified, the Court finds him

guilty of the lesser included offense of Penal Code Section 148, resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer.

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Count 6, Vehicle Code Section 2800.2, evading an officer with willful disregard. Mr. McKay has repeatedly admitted that he was guilty of this offense, but for the record, I wanted Ms. Ponce to do her job. She has done so. Deputy Cole testified that she and her sergeant conducted a traffic stop. The driver was Mr. McKay who, after a time, took off in the truck down the Cajon Pass. The deputy was in uniform, in a marked patrol car with her lights and siren on, the defendant was clearly eluding the deputies, and clearly did so because the deputies lost sight of him for a time and had to depend on 40 King to re-establish There is a clear violation of evading. The only question is whether this is the felony as alleged, or misdemeanor conduct as a lesser included offense. The speed at which defendant was travelling was 40-45 miles per hour. However, there were roadwork signs, cones, at one point defendant was riding on the shoulder, was weaving in and out of traffic, and a couple of times almost colliding with other cars. Once off of the freeway, he further ran a stop sign. This is clearly felony conduct, and the Court finds Mr. McKay quilty of Count 6 beyond a reasonable doubt.

Count 7, 10851, the Court already granted 1118.1 motion. But the Court would like to clear the record. 1118.1 refers to a jury trial. Since this is a court trial, the Court will amend its ruling pursuant to Penal Code Section 1118.

Count 8, Penal Code Section 422(a) criminal threats.

During Ms. Little's ordeal she testified that the defendant at

one point told her that he would kill her and her mother and take everything. She further testified that she was in fear for her life because he was so angry. While the Court does believe that Mr. McKay said these words, and the Court believes he was very angry, the Court is suspicious of the victim adding the knife placed at her throat on redirect. That should have been at the forefront of her testimony, and the Court is curious as to why it was first spoken on redirect. And for the record, the Court read the preliminary hearing transcript and there was no mention of a knife to her throat there either. Nevertheless, Mr. McKay even admitted in his closing that he may have said the words. This evidence clearly constitutes a threat to kill made orally by Mr. McKay. He intended for his statement to be taken as a threat, and the threat was very clear. The Court finds Mr. McKay guilty of this count.

Penal Code Section 496 receiving stolen property exceeding \$950. In this count, the crucial inquiry regarding this charge is whether Mr. McKay knew or should have known that this car was stolen. The condition of the ignition and the way the car was forced to start, coupled with the testimony that the victim had reported that the car was stolen leads this Court to find there was evidence adduced to find Mr. McKay guilty of this count beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, are the special allegations in the Information. Mr. McKay acknowledged in his closing argument that he did indeed commit the prior convictions alleged in the Information. He explained that he did have a firearm in a failed attempt at, quote, "suicide by cop" and pled guilty to that, which

corresponds to a conviction of Penal Code Section 245(a)(2).

Additionally, he admits that he did 13 years at 85 percent in an incident in which two individuals were beaten which may correspond to a Penal Code Section 211, robbery conviction in 2006. However, for the clarity of the record, I will go over the prior convictions and make the determination as to whether or not they are provable as belonging to Mr. McKay.

Exhibit 51 is a L.A. County prior conviction for violation of Penal Code Section 211 under case MA031420 on April 3rd, 2006. In that conviction a prior strike is also admitted pursuant to Penal Code Sections 1170.12 (a) through (d) and Penal Code Section 667(b) through (i) under case FWV17179. The person who entered the plea was William Shae Amador McKay.

Exhibit 52 is from the Department of Corrections and on page 4 there is an Abstract of Judgment concerning William Shae Amador McKay under Case No. MA031420. Among the convictions numerated is violation of Penal Code Section 211, first degree robbery conviction date of April 3rd, 2006. On the last page is a photograph of the person who was convicted. The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person convicted of the prior strike is here in court, Mr. McKay.

Exhibit 53 is an Abstract of Judgment concerning William Shae McKay under case number FWV17179. The conviction was for violation of Penal Code Section 245(a)(2), assault with a firearm conviction date January 21st, 1999.

Exhibit 54 is a Complaint under Case No. FWV17179.

Exhibit 55 is a Minute Order regarding William McKay and on page 5 it shows a plea of guilty to a violation of Penal Code

Section 245(a)(2), assault with a firearm, under Case No. FWV17179.

Exhibit 56 is a plea bargain agreement regarding William Shae McKay. He pled to violation of Penal Code Section 245(a)(2), assault with a firearm on January 21st, 1999.

Exhibit 57 is from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Within the packet is the same abstract of judgment that is Exhibit 53. On the last page is a photograph of the person convicted. The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that this person is Mr. McKay, and that he suffered this conviction.

Those are the verdicts and findings of this Court.

The Court at this time will refer the matter to probation for a pre-sentence investigation report. I must inform counsel, Ms. Ponce may know this, Mr. McKay may not, there will be significant changes in the law in 2022, which may affect the allegations. So I will, unless I hear an objection from counsel, place this matter for sentencing Friday, January 7th, 2022, 8:30, is there any objection?

MS. PONCE: No objection.

MR. MCKAY: Your Honor, I understand there's going to be significant changes in the laws that are going to determine the sentencing. I would like to ask for a stay to be granted to be able to either resume bail or ankle monitor for the holidays.

I've been in jail for seven months. I've learned a valuable lesson in all this. I'm not going nowhere. I sat here for three hours when Ms. Ponce took my bail the first time. I paid bail. I satisfied the government's needs that they asked for at that

And I sat in the front of this courtroom for three hours time. while Ms. Ponce did the paperwork. I'm not going anywhere. There's going to be significant amount of changes to the rules. 3 But to have me sit here for two months while it waits, you know, 4 we're at the beginning of November, that's two months. I'd like to be able to get my affairs in order at home. Consider it a 7 Cruz waiver sort of type thing. I haven't -- the high speed chase was a high speed chase I have admitted to that. 8

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My record reflects that I'm the only person that's been here, between me and Ms. Little, who has proven to be a liar. I've admitted to everything that I've done.

THE COURT: Okay. Hold on. Ms. Ponce, in light of the Court's verdicts, is bail set at one million?

MS. PONCE: I think it's just short of that. I think it was reduced maybe by 50.

MR. MCKAY: It was one million-fifty. But the bail was just put so far overhead, that's why I had a Humphrey's motion ready because I paid the initial bail. I still paid \$300 on that bail that I'm not out on. I'm asking for an OR, Cruz waiver, something. I'll pay for the ankle monitor. I'll check in every I'll come to the district attorney's office once a week or I've gone through this. I'm going to have, like, something. 14 month's credit in. 16, 2, 3 is usually false imprisonment, from what I understand and there's going to be some changes. And I appreciate your verdict. And I went with a judge jury because you're a trier of fact. And I know if I did something, I have to pay for that crime and I will. I'll walk in here gladly in January and take that time if that's necessary, but please don't

make me sit in here for two months just wasting away. I still have to find my dog. I am not going to go -- there's no street justice coming out of me. I learned a whole different thing.

THE COURT: I'm going to stop you right here. The fact of the matter is this is still a three strikes case. Although a million does seem beyond the bail schedule of a three strikes case. I will reset bail at \$500,000, which is the bail for a three strikes case. I will not release you OR because the verdict is in and I have to always be mindful of the fact that you are still looking down the barrel of a life sentence. And so I must keep bail at \$500,000 now. I can entertain something else if you have something else to present, but that is my ruling because the verdict has changed, circumstances have changed and I have adjusted the bail to those circumstances.

MR. MCKAY: Is there any way, your Honor, under the Humphrey's motion, I spent all of my money on the first bail. I can't afford \$500,000. Is there any way to reinstate my bail at what it was to where I pay \$1,000 with the bail bonds I was through? I know it's a lot asking the Court and I appreciate you even entertaining it. And I appreciate no objection from Ms. Ponce, I don't hear one yet. If I can just get my bail reinstated that I currently had, I won't have to pay as much. Because they took the bail they started -- what happened from my understanding, is when Ms. Ponce refiled, she filed under a new case number. So all the money that I paid for that bail, the \$12,000 that I paid out is gone. They don't put that towards my \$500,000 bail now, it's gone. And I still pay \$300. I still have \$17,000 to pay off on it.

THE COURT: Ms. Ponce -- let me ask Ms. Ponce's reaction. MR. MCKAY: 2 Please. MS. PONCE: Your Honor, I think given the change of 3 circumstances and given -- just given the stakes I was going to 4 say no bail should be appropriate. I'll submit to the Court. 5 THE COURT: Okay. That's her stance. And I will leave 6 7 it at \$500,000 at this point to give you an opportunity. So that only leaves when do you want sentencing, so you 8 9 want it within the 20 days? I will tell counsel this, the law is going to change in 2022 so no matter what happens on the day of 10 sentencing, this case may come back. Because once January 1st 11 happens and the new law kicks in, a lot of people are coming 12 back. So that's why I said over to the new year. I'll do it 13 14 within the 20 days if that's what you'll prefer. I'll refer it 15 to probation, we'll come back December 9th, entertain further arguments, if necessary. Right now, Mr. McKay, I'm leaving my 16 ruling as is. See you back here December 9th, 8:30, this 17 department. 18 19 What are we going to do with that trailing case? MS. PONCE: Move to dismiss it. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. Granted. See you back here 21 December 9th, 8:30. 22 MR. MCKAY: Yes, ma'am. 23 (Proceedings were concluded.) 24 25 26 27 28

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
3	DEPARTMENT R-5 HON. CARA D. HUTSON, JUDGE
4	
5	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
6	Plaintiff,) Reporter's) Certificate
7	vs.) Case No. FWV21002096
8	WILLIAM SHAE MCKAY,)
9	Defendant.)
10	
11	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)) ss.
12	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO)
13	
14	
15	I, Julie Quintanilla, Official Reporter of the
16	Superior Court of the State of California, County of
17	San Bernardino, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury that
18	the foregoing pages, 1 through 15, to the best of my knowledge
19	and belief, comprise a full, true, and correct computer-aided
20	transcript of the proceedings held in the above-entitled matter
21	on Monday, November 8, 2021.
22	Dated this 28th day of February, 2023.
23	
24	
25	
26	Julie Quintanilla Official Reporter
27	CSR No. 11309
28	